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Artificial Entities with Natural Rights:
Pursuing Profits at the Expense of
Human Capital
Loren M. Findlay ∗
Abstract
This Note explores the legal and constitutional rights
granted to corporations and highlights how these corporate
benefits are often at the expense of individuals. Over the past
century, the corporation has evolved, taking on human-like
characteristics. While many statutes and the Constitution use the
word “person,” courts have inconsistently interpreted the
definition of “person” in determining when it expands to
corporations. In courts’ ad hoc analysis and interpretation,
individuals get the metaphorical short-end of the stick.
The First Amendment of the Constitution was interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court to afford the right of free speech to
corporations in the context of political spending. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was interpreted as giving
religious protections to for-profit, closely held corporations.
When asked whether a closely held corporation with a single
shareholder is protected under the Fifth Amendment’s right
against self-incrimination, the Court answered in the negative,
again, leaving the individual vulnerable. Lastly, this Note covers
the Supreme Court jurisprudence prohibiting an individual
from suing a foreign corporation acting outside of the United
States under the Alien Tort Statute. The rights and protections
afforded corporations have been determined without much
consistency. The only consistency is the result—harm to
individuals and stakeholders.
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I. Introduction
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. . . . [I]t possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
it . . . .” 1 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the corporation is
legally distinct from the individual, possessing different rights

Candidate for J.D., May 2020, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.
1. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819).
∗
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and powers. 2 Although the Black’s Law definition says
corporations have different rights than individuals, it does not
describe those rights. 3 To begin ascertaining corporate rights,
the Constitution and statutes are proper starting points.
Although the Constitution does not contain the word
“corporation,” over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has given
corporations several constitutional rights and protections. 4
Amidst the uncertainty over corporate rights, the Supreme
Court has attempted to define the rights of corporations on an
ad-hoc basis, in various landmark cases such as Citizens United
v. FEC, 5 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 6 Braswell v. United States, 7
and Jesner v. Arab Bank. 89 These cases illustrate various rights
and protections corporations have as independent legal
entities. 10

2. See Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (outlining
and defining essential properties of a corporation).
3. See id. (stating that a corporation, “ha[s] authority under law to act
as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it”).
4. See Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
605, 608 (2016) (“By and large the rights contained in the Constitution are
inclusive speaking only of ‘people’ or ‘persons’ or, more narrowly, ‘citizens.’”).
5. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010) (holding § 441b
of the United States Code facially invalid because it barred corporations and
unions “from using their general treasury funds for express advocacy or
electioneering communications”).
6. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014)
(holding the contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations,
violated RFRA and is therefore unlawful).
7. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (“[T]he
custodian’s act of production is not deemed a personal act, but rather an act of
the corporation. Any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent
would be tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation—which of
course possesses no such privilege.”).
8. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018)
(determining that the petitioners could not bring a claim against Arab Bank,
a foreign corporation, because the claim falls outside of the parameters of the
Alien Tort Statute).
9. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 608 (“[T]he question of who or what
holds any given constitutional right has been assessed [by the Court] on an ad
hoc basis, right-by-right and claimant-by-claimant.”).
10. Supra cases cited notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
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But how can a corporation, which has “no soul to be damned
and no body to be kicked” 11 also have some of the same
fundamental rights as individuals? Not only do corporations
have some of the same fundamental rights as individuals, many
of the rights individuals have today were first fortified in
lawsuits involving corporations. 12 The Court has consistently
held that corporations are constitutional persons with a range
of constitutional rights. 13 This Note will explore the granting
and denial of certain constitutional and legal rights to
corporations. 14 Often, the method of assigning which legal
rights—those rights protected by United States statutory and
common law—are extended to whom depends on legal
recognition by the Court. 15 The differentiation between who and
what are afforded certain legal rights and to what extent
extends to constitutional rights. 16 This Note highlights a trend
of granting certain rights and protections to corporations while
denying other rights to them which all have the same potential
result—harm to the individual. 17 While part of this Note focuses
on the negative implications certain corporate rights and
protections have on individuals, it does not purport to suggest
all rights given to corporations are damaging, it is merely the
scope of this Note. The variety of cases analyzed is meant to
11. Edward Thurlow, First Baron Thurlow, English jurist and Lord
Chancellor (1731–1803).
12. See ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS, at xxiii (2018) (“Corporate rights were
won in courts of law, by judicial rulings extending fundamental protections to
businesses, even in the absence of any national consensus in favor of corporate
rights.”).
13. See Robinson supra 4, at 622 (“[T]he Court has interpreted the
constitution such that corporations are constitutional persons for an extensive
array of constitutional rights.”).
14. Infra discussions Part II–IV.
15. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 613 (“Legal personhood, then,
determines who or what is entitled to legal recognition.”).
16. See id. (“Constitutional personhood refers to a specific form of legal
personhood that denotes a person’s status as a constitutional rights holder,
entitled to the protective auspices of the rights contained in the U.S.
Constitution.”).
17. Infra discussion Part IV.
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provide examples for which a new framework can be used when
determining if a corporation ought to be afforded certain legal
and constitutional rights. Because there is no consistent
framework under which the Court analyzes these questions, a
uniform framework will provide more predictability and
consistency.
This Note consists of six parts. This part sets forth the
foundation and background information for the Note. Part II
provides both historical and current analysis of the Court
examining what First Amendment rights corporations have. 18
Specifically, Citizens United is examined as the leading case
illustrating a corporation’s right to freedom of speech. 19 Hobby
Lobby illustrates a corporation’s right to freedom of religion
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 20
Part III discusses the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, which is not provided to corporations under
the collective entity doctrine. 21 A corporation’s lack of a
protection against self-incrimination is thoroughly explained
through a series of Supreme Court decisions, ultimately leading
to Braswell v. United States, which still stands as precedent. 22
Part IV analyzes the most recent test of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) in Jesner v. Arab Bank, in which the Court ruled
the ATS does not apply to foreign corporations. 23 Part IV also
gives a historical backdrop of ATS, specifically in the context of

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Infra discussion Part II.
Infra discussion Part II.
Infra discussion Part II.
Infra discussion Part III.
Infra discussion Part III.
Infra discussion Part IV.
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the two modern cases preceding Jesner:
Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain 24 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 2526
Part V compares the similarities and differences of some of
the rights given and denied to corporations (those illustrated in
Parts II–IV). Part V then sets forth a framework, proposing that
corporations’ legal and constitutional rights should be decided
by considering the purpose of the right and then determining
whether that purpose is achieved by granting the right to
corporations. In doing so, the Court should balance the adverse
impact certain corporate rights have on individuals. 27 Part V
applies this framework to each of the four rights discussed in
this Note. 28
The Note concludes in Part VI by reflecting on how the
framework proposed, if implemented by the Court, may have
altered the outcome of the cases. 29 The conclusion aims not to
criticize the Court in its decisions, but rather to propose a
different way of understanding how these rights may be
analyzed. 30 The intention of this Note is to give the reader
perspective on how the personification of corporations
sometimes comes at the expense of individuals and to provide a
potential remedy to this problem. 31

24. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“In sum,
although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action,
the reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law.”).
25. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013)
[A]ll the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And
even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application. . . . [I]t would
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.
(citations omitted).
26. Infra discussion Part IV.
27. Infra discussion Part V.
28. Infra discussion Part V.
29. Infra discussion Part VI.
30. Infra discussion Part VI.
31. Infra discussion Part VI.
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II. A Corporation’s First Amendment Rights
Some corporate legal scholars have found the decisions in
both Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.—both of which further personified the business
corporation—to be a disturbing extension of individual rights to
artificial entities. 32 The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 33 Part II
of this Note will consider a corporation’s First Amendment
rights. Subpart A will address freedom of speech, specifically,
political speech, afforded to corporations. Subpart B will discuss
the religious freedoms given to corporations through statutes
which have their roots in the First Amendment.
A. Right to Free Speech
A core, fundamental tenet in American democracy is
freedom of speech, particularly political speech. 34 It is
established that “political speech does not lose First
Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a
corporation.’” 35 In Buckley v. Valeo, 36 the Supreme Court
equated political spending with political speech and therefore
32. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More
Communitarian: A Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification
of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 898 (2016) (“In both Citizens United
v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
advanced the personification of the business corporation in a manner that
should be disturbing to both corporate legal scholars and communitarians.”).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. See Nadia Imtanes, Should Corporations Be Entitled to the Same
First Amendment Protections as People?, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 203, 212 (2012)
(“One of the bases of America’s democracy is freedom of speech, especially
political speech.”).
35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (citing First Nat’l
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
36. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (declaring various FEC
limitations on campaign contributions unconstitutional).
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laws hindering political spending were tested under a high level
of scrutiny. 37 The Court determined that the Federal Election
Campaign Act’s limit on independent expenditures was
unconstitutional, but did not rule on whether the provision
which limited corporate and union expenditures was also
unconstitutional. 38 The issue of whether corporations were
entitled to First Amendment protections of the right to free
speech through political spending was not decided by the
Supreme Court until 1978 in First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti. 39
In Bellotti, the Court was confronted with a State’s criminal
law that prohibited banks and corporations from making
political contributions. 40 When determining if a law burdening
political speech is constitutional, the Court will use strict
scrutiny. 41 Strict scrutiny “requires the Government to prove
that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” 42 When applying
strict scrutiny, the Court found Massachusetts’s law both
37. See id. at 16 (“[T]his court has never suggested that the dependence
of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself . . . to reduce
the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”).
38. See id. at 143 (“We conclude, however, that the limitations on
campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and
groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds are
constitutionally infirm.”).
39. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978)
(striking down a Massachusetts criminal statute forbidding certain
expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of
influencing the vote on referendum proposals).
40. See id. at 767–68
The statute at issue prohibits appellants, two national banking
associations and three business corporations, from making
contributions or expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets
of the corporation.”
(citations omitted).
41. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (indicating the
laws that burden political speech whether inadvertently or by design are
subject to strict scrutiny).
42. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
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overinclusive and underinclusive, making it fail the “narrowly
tailored” prong, and finding that it unconstitutionally infringed
on a business’s right to political speech. 43
A similar issue involving corporate political spending came
before the Court thirty-two years later in Citizens United v.
FEC. 44 In Citizens United, the complainant, Citizens United,
was a nonprofit organization, which obtained most of its funding
from individuals, but some from for-profit groups. 45 The case
arose when Citizens United sought to release a film called
Hillary: The Movie (Hillary). 46 Hillary was a critical “90-minute
documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a
candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary
elections.” 47 After the movie was released, Citizens United
sought to increase viewership by releasing the movie through
an on-demand forum and also by advertising the movie on
television. 48 Citizens United feared such efforts would run afoul
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). 49
Section 441b of the BCRA prohibited “corporations and unions
from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions
to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form
of media, in connection with certain qualified federal
43. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 (“Because that portion of § 8 challenged
by appellants prohibits protected speech in a manner unjustified by a
compelling state interest, it must be invalidated.”).
44. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 330 (“Citizens United has asserted a
claim that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech.”).
45. See id. at 319 (“Most of its funds are from donations by individuals;
but, in addition, it accepts a small portion of its funds from for-profit
corporations.”).
46. See id. (“In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled
Hillary: The Movie.”).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 320 (“Citizens United desired to promote the
video-on-demand offering by running advertisements on broadcast and cable
television.”).
49. See id. at 321 (“It feared, however, that both the film and the ads
would be covered by § 441b’s ban on corporate-funded independent
expenditures, thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal penalties
under § 437g.”).
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elections.” 50 Because Citizens United desired to make Hillary
available through video-on-demand within thirty days of the
primary elections, it would have violated § 441b’s prohibition on
electioneering communication. 51
The Court in Citizens United went a step further than it
had in past cases and “consider[ed] the facial validity of
§ 441b.” 52 After rejecting Citizens United’s “as applied”
challenge, 53 the Court found § 441b facially unconstitutional
because it stifled a corporation’s freedom of political speech. 54
The dissent criticized the majority for quickly rejecting Citizens
United’s as an applied challenge to § 441b because it “may have
been more suitable in light of Citizens United’s circumstances
as an organization ‘funded overwhelmingly by individuals.’” 55
Despite the dissent’s disapproval of ruling based on the facial
validity of the statute, the Court found § 441b unconstitutional
because “no sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” 56 As
it stands today, for-profit corporations may contribute unlimited
amounts in political donations from their general treasury
pursuant to the First Amendment. 57
50. Id. at 320.
51. See id. at 321 (“Citizens United wanted to make Hillary available
through video-on-demand within 30 days of the 2008 primary elections. . . .
[But, doing so would] subject[] the corporation to civil and criminal
penalties . . . .”).
52. See id. at 333 (stating this further step was necessary “[i]n the
exercise of judicial responsibility.”).
53. See id. at 329 (“As the foregoing analysis confirms, the Court cannot
resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech
that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”).
54. See id. at 385 (“Congress violates the First Amendment when it
decrees that some speakers may not engage in political speech at election time,
when it matters most.”).
55. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 920 (citing Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 404 (2010)).
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
57. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023,
1024–25 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that
corporations have a First Amendment right to make unlimited, independent
campaign expenditures . . . .”).
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B. Right to Religious Freedom
For many years, it has been understood in the United
States that corporations have the right to engage in political
speech, but, as of much more recently, “[a]pparently, they can
get religion too.” 58 In 2014, the Supreme Court recognized
religious protections for closely held, for-profit corporations in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 59 In Hobby Lobby, a suit
was brought by Hobby Lobby, Mardel, Conestoga, the Hahns
(family owner of Conestoga), and the Greens (family owners of
Hobby Lobby and Mardel) (collectively “complainants”) against
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other
federal agencies. 60 Conestoga was a for-profit corporation which
employed 950 people, Hobby Lobby was a for-profit nationwide
chain store that employed over 13,000 individuals, and Mardel
was a business affiliated with Hobby Lobby and employed about
400 people. 61
The complainants challenged a mandate promulgated
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
which “generally require[d] employers with 50 or more full-time
employees to offer a group health plan or group health insurance
coverage that provides minimum essential coverage.” 62 Part of
this essential coverage included requiring an “employer’s group
health plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish
preventative care and screenings for women without any cost
sharing requirements.” 63 The mandate, however, gave an

58. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 925 (describing the effect of
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hobby Lobby decision).
59. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014)
(“For all these reasons, we hold that a federal regulation’s restriction on the
activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.”).
60. See id. at 703 (outlining the relevant parties).
61. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature
of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1728–29
(2015) (providing background on the complainants).
62. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 696 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
63. Id. at 696–97.
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exemption to non-profit and religious organizations. 64 Included
in women’s coverage were all FDA approved contraceptive
methods, four of which were at issue in this case. 65 The four
contraceptives contested “may have the effect of preventing an
already fertilized egg from developing any further by inhibiting
its attachment to the uterus.” 66
The complainants argued that the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 67 The Hahns, family owners of Conestoga, were
devout Christians who decided to run their businesses in
accordance with their Christian beliefs. 68 According to the
Hahns, providing four of the contraceptive methods they
thought were abortifacients—an abortion inducing drug—
would violate their religious beliefs. 69 Similarly, the Greens
were also sincere Christians who were committed to operating
their two family businesses, Hobby Lobby and Mardel, in line
with those Christian beliefs. 70 The Hahns and the Greens both
objected to the same four contraceptive methods as violating
their religious beliefs because they believed those contraceptive
methods were abortifacients. 71
64. See id. at 692 (“HHS has already devised and implemented a system
that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations
while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same
access to all FDA-approved contraceptives . . . .”).
65. See id. at 703 (“[The Greens] specifically object to the same four
contraceptive methods as the Hahns and, like the Hahns, they have no
objection to the other 16 FDA-approved methods of birth control.”).
66. Id. at 697–98.
67. See id. at 703–04 (“The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel sued HHS
and other federal agencies and officials to challenge the contraceptive
mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.”).
68. See id. at 700 (“Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are
devout members of the Mennonite Church.”).
69. Id. at 701.
70. See id. at 703 (“Each family member has signed a pledge to run the
business in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family
assets to support Christian ministries.”).
71. See id. (“Like the Hahns, the Greens believe that life begins at
conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to
contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point.”).
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RFRA “prohibits the Government from substantially
burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability” unless the
Government can show that the burden to the person furthers a
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to
achieve that compelling interest. 72 While RFRA applies to
“persons,” the Court quickly shot down HHS’s argument that
the plaintiffs, as corporations, could not even bring suit under
RFRA. 73 Instead, the Court came to the conclusion that
“Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and
Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included
corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’” 74 When
reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at the Dictionary Act
definition of the word “person,” which included corporations,
and decided that if Congress did not want to include
corporations, it would have explicitly said so. 75 Furthermore,
the Court found no good reason to distinguish between
non-profit and for-profit corporations when granting religious
protections. 76 Despite persuasive arguments from HHS and the
dissenting justices, the Court concluded that RFRA protects
for-profit corporations. 77 The Court reasoned that “allowing
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims
protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns.” 78
72. Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. See id.
HHS contends that neither these companies nor their owners can
even be heard under RFRA . . . because they seek to make a profit
for their owners, and the owners cannot be heard because the
regulations . . . apply only to the companies and not the owners as
individuals. HHS’s argument would have dramatic consequences.
74. Id. at 706.
75. See id. at 708 (“Thus, unless there is something about the RFRA
context that ‘indicates otherwise,’ the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear,
and affirmative answer to the question whether the companies involved in
these cases may be heard.”).
76. See id. (“No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some
but not all corporations.”).
77. See id. at 709 (“Furthering their religious freedom also ‘furthers
individual religious freedom.’”).
78. Id.
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After determining that closely held, for-profit corporations
were protected under RFRA, the Court then assessed whether
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA by “substantially
burdening the exercise of religion.” 79 The Court looked at the
steep financial burden mandate noncompliance puts on the
corporations. 80 The Court illustrated the gravity of the potential
fines: “For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 million
per day or about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the
assessment could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year;
and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million
per year.” 81 HHS responded by arguing there was no substantial
burden on the exercise of religion because requiring a company
to provide health coverage that included the contraceptive
mandate was too attenuated of a link to what the companies
found to be morally wrong—destruction of an embryo. 82 The
Court dismissed this argument for not answering “whether the
HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the
objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their
religious beliefs.” 83 After looking at the potential penalties the
corporations would face, the Court found the mandate imposed
a substantial burden on the businesses. 84
79. See id. at 719 (noting that the court had little trouble in determining
that the HHS contraceptive mandate did substantially burden the free
exercise of religion).
80. See id. at 720 (“If the companies continue to offer group health plans
that do not cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day
for each affected individual.”).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 723
HHS’s main argument (echoed by the principal dissent) is basically
that the connection between what the objecting parties must do
(provide health insurance coverage for four methods of
contraception that may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and
the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an
embryo) is simply too attenuated.
83. Id. at 724.
84. See id. at 726 (“Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay
an enormous sum of money—as much as $475 million per year in the case of
Hobby Lobby—if they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance
with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden
on those beliefs.”).
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Once the Court decided the contraceptive mandate imposed
a substantial burden on the businesses, the mandate could only
survive if it passed the strict scrutiny test. 85 Under strict
scrutiny, HHS first had to show the mandate was in
“furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.” 86 HHS
provided the Court with several compelling governmental
interests such as promoting public health, gender equality, and
ensuring women have access to all FDA approved
contraceptives. 87 The Court agreed promoting public health,
gender equality, and ensuring women have access to all
FDA-approved contraceptives may be compelling state interests
and proceeded to assess whether HHS had used the least
restrictive means when furthering that interest—the second
prong of strict scrutiny analysis. 88 The Court concluded the
contraceptive mandate the HHS imposed was not the least
restrictive means for furthering the compelling government
interest. 89 There were other viable alternatives the Government
and HHS could pursue. 90 Because the Government could
“assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to
any women who are unable to obtain them under their
health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious

85. See id. (“Since the HHS contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion, we must . . . decide whether HHS has
shown that the mandate both ‘(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.’”).
86. Id.
87. See id. (“HHS asserts that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety
of important interests, but many of these are couched in very broad terms,
such as promoting ‘public health’ and ‘gender equality.’”) (citations omitted).
88. See id. at 728 (“We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing
cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling
within the meaning of RFRA and we will proceed to consider the final prong
of the RFRA test.”).
89. See id. (“The least-restrictive means standard is exceptionally
demanding, and it is not satisfied here.”) (citations omitted).
90. See id. (“HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving
its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of
religion by the objecting parties in these cases.”).
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objections,” 91 the Court concluded that requiring employers to
go against their religious beliefs, was not the least restrictive
means. 92 The contraceptive mandate could not pass strict
scrutiny, making it unlawful. 93 The Court ultimately decided
the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA and did not analyze
the First Amendment issue, leaving undecided whether or not a
for-profit corporation can find religious protection under the
Constitution. 94
III. The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination Is
Not Applicable to Corporations
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.” 95 Despite the plain language of
the constitutional amendment, the right to invoke the Fifth
Amendment may be available in civil, criminal, and bankruptcy
proceedings. 96 The government infringes on an individual’s
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual can
show that: (1) there is testimony; (2) the testimony is compelled;
and (3) the testimony is incriminating. 97 In general, an

91. Id.
92. See id. at 730 (“[T]he HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-means
test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that
is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that
violate their religious beliefs.”).
93. See id. at 736 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held
corporations, violates RFRA.”).
94. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 665 (“Although the litigation
culminated in a Supreme Court decision that focused solely on the statutory
claims made by the corporate litigants, the constitutional issue was argued
before the Court, and the potential for a corporate religious liberty claim
remains.”).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (indicating
that compelling testimony from an unwilling witness in a civil case is
permitted by conferring immunity so long as the compelled testimony and
evidence derived therefrom is not used in subsequent criminal proceedings).
97. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (describing an
infringement of the right against self-incrimination when there is compulsion,
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individual may not invoke the right against self-incrimination
to avoid compliance with a subpoena seeking pre-existing
records because the creation of those records was voluntary, and
thus not compelled. 98 While the contents of documents are not
protected under the Fifth Amendment, the act of producing
those
documents
implicates
the
privilege
against
self-incrimination if the act of production is testimonial. 99
The Supreme Court established the collective entity
doctrine in Hale v. Henkel 100 when it determined that a
corporation has no Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. 101 The decision in Hale imposed restrictions
on the scope of the Fifth Amendment, but left open questions
concerning “whether a corporate custodian could resist a
subpoena for corporate documents by invoking his own Fifth
Amendment privilege.” 102 The subsequent cases after Hale
further refined the nuances of the collective entity doctrine.
In Wilson v. United States, 103 the Supreme Court
determined that a corporate custodian in possession of corporate
whether that act-of-production is testimonial, and whether it is
incrimination).
98. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (“As we noted in
Fisher, the Fifth Amendment protects the person asserting the privilege only
from compelled self-incrimination. Where the preparation of business records
is voluntary, no compulsion is present.”) (citations omitted).
99. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (illustrating that the act of producing
documents may have “communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced”).
100. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1906) (holding that an officer
of a corporation cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such a
corporation when it has been charged with the violation of a statute).
101. See id. at 75 (“While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions . . . it does not follow that a corporation . . . may
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”).
102. Thomas J. Koffer, Note, All Quiet on the Paper Front: Asserting a
Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Production of Corporate Documents in In
re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated January 29, 1999, 46
VILL. L. REV. 547, 557 (2001).
103. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383–84 (1911) (resolving
the question left open in Hale about whether a corporate custodian may resist
a subpoena for corporate documents by invoking his own Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
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documents could not refuse to produce subpoenaed documents,
even if the target of the investigation was the individual, not the
corporation. 104 Throughout the early and mid-twentieth
century, the Court continued to expand the collective entity
doctrine in deciding three cases. 105 In 1913, the Supreme Court
in Wheeler v. United States 106 ruled that the collective entity
doctrine encompassed subpoenaed documents of a dissolved
corporation. 107 In Wheeler, the Government served subpoenas
duces tecum 108 on Mr. Wheeler, the treasurer of Shaw, Inc.,
when the corporation dissolved. 109 Wheeler argued that because
the corporation was dissolved, he could exercise his privilege
against self-incrimination and did not have to produce corporate
documents. 110 The Court disagreed and ordered the production
of the subpoenaed documents pursuant to the collective entity
doctrine, finding dissolution immaterial. 111
104. See id. at 384 (“If the corporation were guilty of misconduct, he could
not withhold its books to save it; and if he were implicated in the violations of
law, he could not withhold the books to protect himself from the effect of their
disclosures.”).
105. See Koffer, supra note 102, at 558 (providing the framework for the
twentieth century expansion of the collective entity doctrine).
106. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1974) (holding that
privilege of corporate officers against self-incrimination in the production of
their own effects before a grand jury does not protect the former officers of a
dissolved corporation in resisting compulsory production of those effects).
107. See id. (“Wheeler and Shaw had been officers of the corporation, and
the books of the company had, before the dissolution, been made over to them;
but this did not change the essential character of the books and papers, or
make them anymore privileged to the investigation of crime than they were
before.”).
108. See Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A subpoena
ordering the witness to appear in court and to bring specified documents,
records, or things.”).
109. See Wheeler, 226 U.S. at 482–83 (“On the same day a subpoena duces
tecum . . . was issued, summoning the corporation to appear before the grand
jury and produce all the cash books, ledgers, journals, and other books of
account of the company . . . .”).
110. See id. at 483–85 (outlining the reasons for the defendant’s refusal to
produce the papers and records).
111. See id. at 488–90 (holding the dissolution of the corporation
immaterial because the essential character of the documents did not change
and were still corporate in nature).
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Three decades after Wheeler, the Court expanded the
collective entity doctrine to apply to labor unions in United
States v. White. 112 The expansion of the collective entity doctrine
culminated in 1974 in Bellis v. United States. 113 In Bellis, the
petitioner, Isadore Bellis, was one of three partners at a small
law firm until 1969 when he left the firm and the partnership
dissolved. 114 After the dissolution of the partnership, Bellis was
served with subpoenas directing him to appear and testify
before a grand jury and to produce all corporate documents in
his possession. 115 Bellis refused to produce corporate records,
asserting
his
Fifth
Amendment
privilege
against
self-incrimination. 116 The Court refused to grant him protection
under the Fifth Amendment, even though the partnership was
dissolved and Bellis was only one of three partners at the
firm. 117 Instead, the Court found that because of the
“inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only act to produce
its records through its individual officers or agents, recognition
of the individual’s claim of privilege . . . would . . . largely
frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such
organizations.” 118
Wheeler, White, and Bellis paved the way for the most
recent Supreme Court case regarding the collective entity

112. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700–01 (1974) (expanding
the collective entity doctrine to apply to a labor union).
113. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 97 (1974) (finding that a
partner holding subpoenaed records of the dissolved three-person law firm in
a representative capacity, does not give the custodian of the corporate
documents a greater claim of Fifth Amendment privilege and must produce
those corporate documents).
114. See id. at 86 (“Until 1969, petitioner Isadore Bellis was the senior
partner in Bellis, Kolsby & Wolf, a law firm in Philadelphia.”).
115. Id.
116. See id. (“Petitioner appeared on May 9 but refused to produce the
records, claiming, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination.”).
117. See id. at 97 (“[T]he District Court . . . held that petitioner’s personal
privilege did not extend to the partnership’s financial books and
records . . . .”).
118. Id. at 90.
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doctrine: Braswell v. United States. 119 The petitioner in
Braswell initially operated his business as a sole proprietorship
but then had it incorporated. 120 Braswell was the sole
shareholder of his corporation and he, his wife, and his mother
held the only board and officer positions. 121 The Court found the
change from a sole proprietorship to a corporation critical
because of the long-established treatment of the collective entity
doctrine. 122 The distinguishing feature between collective entity
doctrine and the act-of-production doctrine is that “the collective
entity doctrine applies in cases involving corporations and the
act of production doctrine applies in cases involving sole
proprietorships.” 123 The Court reiterated that because a
corporation acts through its agents, an individual acting in their
corporate capacity is not protected against self-incrimination
under the act-of-production doctrine. 124 The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected Braswell’s argument that the subpoenas
requiring him to produce the books and records of the company

119. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988) (holding that
a corporate president could not use the act-of-production doctrine to shield him
from producing corporate documents in his custodial capacity because the
collective entity doctrine prevailed).
120. See id. at 100–01 (“From 1965 to 1980, petitioner Randy Braswell
operated his business . . . as a sole proprietorship. In 1980, he incorporated
Worldwide Machinery Sales, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, and began
conducting the business through that entity.”).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 104 (“[P]etitioner has operated his business through the
corporate form, and we have long recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently
from individuals.”).
123. Alice W. Yao, Comment, Former Corporate Officers and Employees in
the Context of the Collective Entity and Act of Production Doctrines, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1487, 1496 (2001).
124. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 107 (“The plain mandate of these decisions
is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the
corporation, or as here to the individual in his capacity as a custodian . . . a
corporate custodian such as petitioner may not resist a subpoena for corporate
records on Fifth Amendment grounds.”).
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in which he served as president violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 125
The collective entity doctrine cases illustrate that as long as
a business is incorporated, a representative in custody of
business records may not refuse production, even if the business
is small or the partnership has been dissolved. 126 Part V will
discuss how this rule exposes individuals to civil liability,
independent of any cause of action against the entity. 127
IV. The Alien Tort Statute Does Not Permit Individuals to Sue
Foreign Corporations Acting Outside of the United States
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) was created in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 and states that “the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 128 The ATS was originally viewed solely as a
jurisdictional statute, granting no new causes of action for
plaintiffs. 129 The ATS was only invoked a handful of times in the
first 190 years after its enactment. 130 The twenty-first century
sequence of ATS cases began with Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 131
In Sosa, plaintiff Umberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) was
abducted from Mexico and extradited to the United States,
125. See id. at 119 (“Consistent with our precedent, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that petitioner could not resist the
subpoena for corporate documents on the ground that the act of production
might tend to incriminate him. The judgment is therefore affirmed.”).
126. Supra discussion Part III.
127. Infra Part V.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
129. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (“[T]he ATS is
a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action . . . .”).
130. See Rebecca J. Hamilton, Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386 United
States Supreme Court, April 24, 2018, 112 AM. J. INT’L 720, 720 (2018) (“After
almost two centuries of dormancy, the ATS was revived at the urging of
American human rights lawyers in 1980, ushering the modern era of
transnational human rights litigation in U.S. courts.”).
131. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (finding that there was no violation of
customary international law so well defined as to support creation of a cause
of action that a district court could hear a claim under the ATS).
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where he brought a civil action against Jose Francisco Sosa
under the ATS for violation of the law of nations. 132 The lower
courts determined that Alvarez could bring a cause of action
under the ATS for violation of the law of nations because the
ATS provided a cause of action. 133 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Sosa and the United States government argued the ATS
only granted jurisdiction to the courts, and did not permit any
new cause of action without express congressional
authorization. 134 The Court went through different historical
interpretations of the ATS and determined it was jurisdictional
in nature and limited to a narrow set of violations of the law of
nations. 135 The Court ultimately found that Alvarez’s claim of
arbitrary detention did not violate any law of nations and
therefore he could not bring a claim under the ATS. 136
Less than ten years after Sosa, the Supreme Court was
presented with another ATS suit: This time the issue involved
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 137 The petitioners
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co. 138 were Nigerian nationals
132. See id. at 698 (“[P]etitioner Jose Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez
from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought him by private
plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers.”).
133. See id. at 699 (“The District Court . . . awarded summary judgment
and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim.”).
134. See id. at 712 (stating that the petitioners argued that “there is no
relief under the ATS because the statute does no more than vest federal courts
with jurisdiction”).
135. See id. at 724 (“[T]he reasonable inference from the historical
materials is that the statute was intended to have the practical effect the
moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as . . . provid[ing]
a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations . . . .”).
136. See id. at 738 (“Whatever may be said for the broad principal Alvarez
advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that
exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require.”).
137. See Ursula T. Doyle, The Whole Wide World: Recognizing Jus Cogens
Violations under the Alien Tort Statute, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 46
(2018) (“[P]articularly since Kiobel, in which the Court held that the statutory
canon of interpretation known as the ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’
applies to the ATS.”).
138. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013)
(holding that principles underlying presumption against extraterritoriality
constrains courts exercising their powers under the Alien Tort Statute).
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residing in the United States and sued various Dutch, British,
and Nigerian corporations under the ATS. 139 The petitioners
alleged that “Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni
villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents” and
the respondents aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
these atrocities. 140 Because these allegations of violence all
occurred in Nigeria, to Nigerian nationals, the Court had to
determine whether it could recognize a cause of action under the
ATS. 141 The respondents argued, and the Court agreed, that an
ATS claim may not reach conduct solely occurring in a foreign
sovereign. 142 The presumption against extraterritoriality
provided that if a statute did not indicate an extraterritorial
reach, then it had none. 143 The presumption against
extraterritoriality reinforces the belief that United States’ law
governs domestically, not globally. 144 Using this policy
consideration, the Court determined that because all the
conduct took place in Nigeria, the petitioners’ claim of violations
of the law of nations under the ATS was barred. 145 Lastly, the
Court said that the presumption against extraterritoriality as
applied to ATS claims could only be displaced if the claims

139. See id. at 111 (outlining the background and posture of Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.).
140. Id. at 113.
141. See id. at 111 (“The question presented is whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.”).
142. See id. at 115 (“Respondents contend that claims under the ATS do
not, relying primarily on a canon of statutory interpretation known as the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”).
143. See id. (“That canon provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none . . . .’”).
144. See id. (“[T]he ‘presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
145. See id. at 124 (“We therefore conclude the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the
statute rebuts that presumption . . . and petitioners’ case seeking relief for
violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”).
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alleged “touch and concern” the United States and do so with
“sufficient force.” 146
Most recently, in a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled
on another ATS claim in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 147 this time
against a Jordanian bank that allegedly transferred funds to
terrorist organizations. 148 The petitioners in Jesner were
persons or family members of persons injured or killed in
various terrorist attacks in the Middle East. 149 Petitioners
sought to impose liability on the Arab Bank, a foreign
corporation, for the acts of its employees, who allegedly knew
the funds transferred were going to terrorist organizations. 150
The Court addressed the ATS claim by first determining
“whether the law of nations impose[d] liability on corporations
for human rights violations committed by its employees.” 151
After addressing the first issue, the Court then determined
“whether it ha[d] authority and discretion in an ATS suit to
impose liability on a corporation without a specific direction
from Congress to do so.” 152
Arab Bank was a predominately Jordanian bank, but had
branches all across the world, including in New York City. 153
Petitioners alleged Arab Bank cleared dollar-denominated
146. See id. at 125 (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress
were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.”).
147. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) (holding
that liability under the Alien Tort Statute will not be extended to foreign
corporations unless Congress takes further action).
148. See id. at 1393 (“Some of Arab Bank’s officials, it is alleged, allowed
the Bank to be used to transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East,
which in turn enabled or facilitated criminal acts of terrorism, causing deaths
or injuries for which petitioners now seek compensation.”).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1394 (“Petitioners contend that international and domestic
laws impose responsibility and liability on a corporation if its human agents
use the corporation to commit crimes in violation of international laws that
protect human rights.”).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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transactions through its New York branch, some of which went
directly to the benefit of terrorist organizations in the Middle
East. 154 It is common practice for foreign banks to use their
United States branch for dollar-denominated transactions
through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS), which occur without human assistance. 155 Arab
Bank’s connection with New York through its New York branch
was the relationship petitioners relied on when bringing suit. 156
The Court began by deciding whether the Petitioner’s claim
passed the Sosa test, specifically, “whether a plaintiff [could]
demonstrate that the alleged violation [was] of a norm that is
specific, universal, and obligatory.” 157 Because, unlike Sosa, the
claim was against an entity, the Court looked at footnote 20 of
the Sosa Court of Appeals opinion, which raised doubt about
whether corporations may be liable for violations of
international law and norms. 158 In footnote 20, the Sosa Court
said that “a related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual.” 159 When interpreting
footnote 20, the Jesner Court ultimately decided principles of
international law did not extend liability “for human-rights

154. See id. (“[P]etitioners allege as well that Arab Bank used its New
York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions through the Clearing
House Interbank Payment System . . . commonly referred to as CHIPS.”).
155. Id. at 1394–95.
156. See id. at 1393 (“Petitioners seek to prove Arab Bank helped the
terrorists receive the moneys in part by means of currency clearances and
bank transactions passing through its New York City offices, all by means of
electronic transfers.”).
157. Id. at 1399 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)).
158. See id. at 1399–400
In the course of holding that international norms must be
‘sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,’ the Court in Sosa
noted that a ‘related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.
159. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
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violations to corporations or other artificial entities.” 160 The
Court determined that “absent further action from Congress it
would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to
foreign corporations.” 161 When deferring to Congress, the Court
noted that the only cause of action created by Congress under
the ATS was the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and that
the rest were court-made. 162 The Court stated that foreign
corporations were not subject to liability under ATS because the
TVPA “limits liability to ‘individuals,’ which, the Court has held,
unambiguously limits liability to natural persons.” 163 The Court
assumed that because the only Congress-made cause of action
under ATS was limited to individuals, then the Court should not
extend the scope to corporations. 164
The Court reasoned that foreign plaintiffs harmed by
corporations still had remedies available because they could sue
individual corporate employees under the ATS. 165 The Court
also reasoned that foreign corporations should not be liable
under ATS because if the United States allowed lawsuits
against foreign corporations, foreign sovereigns would respond
by haling American corporations into their courts for violating
the law of nations. 166 The Court was concerned that setting this
standard would dissuade American corporations from investing
and doing business abroad, especially in regions with a history

160. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018) (noting
that this is confirmed by the fact that international criminal tribunals often
exclude corporations from their jurisdictional reach).
161. Id. at 1403.
162. See id. (“Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an
ATS common-law action is the TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS
created by Congress rather than the courts.”).
163. Id. at 1404.
164. See id. (“Congress’ decision to exclude liability for corporations in
actions brought under the TPVA is all but dispositive of the present case.”).
165. See id. at 1405 (“[P]laintiffs still can sue the individual corporate
employees responsible for a violation of international law under the ATS.”).
166. See id. (“This judicially mandated doctrine, in turn, could subject
American corporations to an immediate, constant risk of claims seeking to
impose massive liability for the alleged conduct of their employees and
subsidiaries around the world . . . .”).
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of human rights violations. 167 Lastly, the Court stated that the
purpose of the ATS was to “promote harmony in international
relations” and in the current lawsuit, the opposite was
occurring. 168 With all of these considerations in mind, the Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment dismissing the
petitioners’ ATS claims. 169
V. Analysis of the Case Law
Unfortunately for legal scholars, law students, and the
general members of society, “there is no consistent, unified
approach across the Court’s corporate constitutional personhood
cases.” 170 This Part is meant to synthesize the outcomes and
reasoning of the cases discussed in Parts II–IV. This Part first
highlights the similar effects the cases have, then considers
inherent contradictions in the Court’s reasoning in the cases
previously discussed, and lastly proposes a more unified
framework with which to assess corporation’s rights.
Despite the inconsistent way in which the Court has chosen
to assign rights to corporations, there are some similarities in
the results. Specifically, “the collective entity doctrine and the
Citizens United/Hobby Lobby line of cases may share a common
disregard for the interests of employees and minority
shareholders.” 171 Notwithstanding the reality that granting
corporations political speech rights may silence the speech of
167. See id. at 1406 (“In other words, allowing plaintiffs to sue foreign
corporations under the ATS could establish a precedent that discourages
American corporations from investing abroad, including in developing
economies where the host government might have a history of alleged humanrights violations . . . .”).
168. See id. (“The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international
relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law
violations in circumstances where the absence of such a remedy might provoke
foreign nations to hold the United States accountable.”).
169. See id. at 1408 (“For these reasons, judicial deference requires that
any imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of
international law must be determined in the first instance by the political
branches of Government.”).
170. Robinson, supra note 4, at 625.
171. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 911.
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minority shareholders as well as the general public, the Court
in Citizens United quickly brushed that concern aside,
dismissing it as not determinative of the case. 172 Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Citizens United went into great detail about
when it comes to freedom of speech, the identity of the speaker
does not matter. 173 He concluded that “the [First] Amendment
is written in terms of speech, not speakers” and there is no basis
for “excluding any category of speaker, from the single
individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated
associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of
individuals.” 174 If, at the time of the Constitutional Convention,
corporations were “legally privileged organizations that had to
be closely scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes
had to be made consistent with the public welfare,” 175 then
should our country and our Courts prioritize, emphasize, and
facilitate individual’s political voices? Perhaps in line with that
concern over corporate power, after Citizens United, there was
great resistance: “As of 2016, sixteen states and hundreds of
municipalities had endorsed a constitutional amendment to
overturn Citizens United and clarify that constitutional rights
belong to human beings, not corporations.” 176
In stark contrast to the Court in Citizens United, the
Braswell Court found the distinction between a sole
proprietorship and an artificial entity dispositive. 177 The

172. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 1024 (“When the Supreme
Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have a First
Amendment right to make unlimited, independent campaign expenditures, it
dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the corporate leadership’s use of
corporate resources on politics might infringe the rights of dissenting
shareholders.”).
173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the concern of the First Amendment is the speech,
not the speaker).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
176. WINKLER, supra note 12, at xvi.
177. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (“Artificial
entities such as corporations act only through their agents, and a custodian’s
assumption of his representative capacity leads to certain obligations,
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moment one incorporates, even if he/she is the sole shareholder,
the newly formed corporation is not protected by the right
against self-incrimination. 178 In Braswell, the distinction
between corporations and sole proprietorships directly conflicts
with the reasoning given in Hobby Lobby when the majority said
religious protection does not discriminate between corporations
and sole proprietorships. 179 Although the Court made the
blanket statement that RFRA does not discriminate between
for-profit corporations and sole proprietorships or partnerships,
it did not substantiate that statement. 180 The Hobby Lobby
Court rhetorically asked “[i]f . . . a sole proprietorship that
seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why
can’t Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the same?” 181 The
Court justified not drawing the distinction between artificial
entities and individuals based on the theory that corporations
are associations of the people, and the individual’s beliefs cannot
be separated from the corporation’s. 182 It is difficult to reconcile
the Court’s willingness to extend political speech rights and
religious freedoms to corporations in Hobby Lobby and Citizens

including the duty to produce corporate records on proper demand by the
Government.”).
178. See id. at 102 (“The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the
collective entity doctrine does not apply when a corporation is so small that it
constitutes nothing more than the individual’s alter ego.”).
179. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 691 (2014)
(“The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did not
discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to run their
businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious
beliefs.”).
180. See id. at 692 (“Although HHS has made this system available to
religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the contraceptive
mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same system cannot be made
available when the owners of for-profit corporations have similar religious
objections.”).
181. Id. at 710.
182. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply
because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”).
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United, but refuse to do so for the right against
self-incrimination in Braswell. 183
“Corporations are the major players of the twenty-first
century,” 184 and our Courts ought to hold them to a higher level
of accountability. In Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Court was
concerned that allowing an ATS suit against a corporate
defendant would set bad precedent around the world, when in
reality, “the picture emerging from America’s highest court is of
a playing field in which corporations enjoy plenty of rights, and
the rest of us face a shrinking set of tools to hold them
accountable.” 185 In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Jesner,
international litigation in the United States for violation of
human rights by foreign corporations is no longer an option
under the ATS. 186 While Jesner did not completely eliminate the
ATS, “it may reasonably be viewed as its 990th paper cut.” 187
In the realm of freedom of political speech and religion, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and protection against
being sued under the Alien Tort Statute, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution and various federal laws in favor
of corporations—sometimes to the detriment of individuals. The
Court’s personification of corporations has gotten more extreme
and tends to directly contradict the objectives of corporate
183. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 910–11
[T]he Braswell Court’s acknowledgement that, under the collective
entity doctrine, incorporation can deprive the incorporator(s) of
their constitutional rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, stands in stark contrast to the view of
corporate personhood that the Court accepted 20-plus years later in
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby.
184. Hamilton, supra note 130, at 726.
185. Todd Tucker, Is the Supreme Court Going Too Easy on Overseas
Corporations?, POLITICO (May 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/agenda
/story/2018/05/08/supreme-court-overseas-corporate-accountability-000659
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q8FS-ABHF].
186. See Hamilton, supra note 130, at 720 (“The exclusion of transnational
human rights litigation from U.S. federal courts is, for most practical
purposes, now complete.”).
187. See id. at 724 (“In its heyday, some two decades ago, the ATS was a
beacon of hope for survivors of human rights atrocities. That period is now
over. . . . What remains of the ATS is highly circumscribed.”).
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law. 188 With its various holdings, the Court has oscillated
between focusing on who the claimant is when deciding if they
are afforded a certain right and putting the emphasis on the
purpose of the right itself. 189
A. Proposed Unified Framework
This subpart proposes a more dependable framework with
which various constitutional and legal rights could be assessed
by the Court. While other scholars have proposed tests for the
Court to use, their proposals have focused on corporate
constitutional rights exclusively, not factoring in the harm done
to individuals. 190 When deciding whether a constitutional or
statutory right applies to corporations, the Court should first
look to the purpose of the right in question; second, determine
whether that purpose is achieved when the right is extended to
corporations; and lastly, consider the potential adverse impacts
granting that right to corporations may have on individuals.
This framework will be applied to each of the four constitutional
and legal rights previously discussed in this Note. 191
Issues arose in the forgoing cases over whether or not
corporations were protected under a certain constitutional
provision or federal legislation. In Citizens United, the Court
188. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 969 (“Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court’s expansive view of corporate rights and its limitation on the
ability of the legislature—state or federal—to constrict those rights broadens
the constitutionally protected functions of the corporation and repudiates
those who would limit corporate objectives to only the maximization of
shareholder profit.”).
189. See Robinson, supra 4, at 655–56 (“[T]he Court’s predominant focus
has been on the right at issue rather than the claimant. . . . [There] are a
number of examples where the court has held that the nature of the claimant
is determinative of their constitutional personhood.”).
190. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 61, at 1679–80 (concluding that the
Court has recognized corporate Constitutional rights as derivative rights,
stemming from the people who comprise the corporation); see also Robinson,
supra note 4, at 612 (proposing a “functional framework for determining
constitutional personhood that focuses on the purpose of the right at issue,
and measures the fit of the claimant with that purpose in order to determine
whether constitutional personhood should vest”).
191. Infra Parts V.A.1–4.
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grappled with the issue of whether the First Amendment’s
freedom of political speech applied with equal force to
corporations as to individuals; 192 in Hobby Lobby, whether
closely held corporations had religious protections under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act; 193 in Braswell, whether the
collective entity doctrine precluded a sole shareholder of a
corporation from invoking his right against self-incrimination
when subpoenaed to produce corporate documents; 194 and
Jesner, whether the Alien Tort Statute could be used to sue a
foreign corporation for tortious acts committed abroad. 195
1. Proposed Framework and Citizens United v. FEC
The First Amendment’s protection of speech is moored in
the United States’ notion of democracy. 196 The purpose of the
192. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–42 (2010) (determining
the facial validity of § 441b, which disallowed corporations to use its general
treasury funds to make independent political expenditures for speech that
qualifies as electioneering communication).
193. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688 (2014)
We must decide in these cases whether the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permits the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand that
three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage
for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious
beliefs of the companies’ owners.
(citations omitted).
194. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988) (“[W]hether
the custodian of corporate records may resist a subpoena for such records on
the ground that the act of production would incriminate him in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.”).
195. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1394 (2018) (deciding
whether the Court has the authority to make extend ATS liability to foreign
corporations that commit crimes in violation of international laws, without
express authorization from the legislature).
196. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an
essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.”); see also Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978) (“Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function
in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period.” (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940))).
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right has been seen as a “fundamental component of the liberty
safeguarded by the Due Process Clause.” 197 In Citizens United,
the Court stressed that the purpose of the fundamental right of
political speech protects the speech itself, irrespective of the
identity of the speaker. 198 Under the theory that the right
protects speech without taking into consideration the identity of
the speaker, extending the right to corporations was a natural
extension according to the Court. 199 The Court took the stance
that because § 441b prohibited corporations from making
independent political contributions, the law was an
unconstitutional ban on political speech. 200 The dissent,
however, pointed out that there have been several instances in
which limiting political speech has been upheld without
violating the purpose of the right. 201 Additionally, despite the
fact that corporations were permitted to make unlimited
donations through political action committees (PACs), the Court
still found § 441b’s restriction to violate the First
Amendment. 202 The Court reasoned that because PACs are
created by corporations, their donations are not corporate
speech, and even if it was, PACs are “burdensome alternatives”
and “expensive to administer.” 203 What the Court did not
197. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780.
198. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate
identity.”).
199. See id. at 342 (“This protection has been extended by explicit holdings
to the context of political speech. Under the rationale of these precedents,
political speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its
source is a corporation.’” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784)).
200. See id. at 339 (“If § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe
that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose
and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be
suspect.”).
201. See id. at 423 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“These statutes burden the
political expression of one class of speakers, namely, civil servants.”).
202. See id. at 337 (majority opinion) (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate
speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still
speak.”).
203. See id.
A PAC is a separate association from a corporation. So the PAC
exemption from § 441b’s expenditure ban, § 441b(b)(2), does not
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address in great detail was the possible ramifications its ruling
would have on individuals.
Even if the Court in Citizens United accomplished steps one
and two of the proposed framework—concluding that the
purpose of political speech is to promote democracy, which
should not be burdened, and that that purpose was furthered by
affording political speech to corporations—it did not adequately
account for the harm which would result to individuals. The law
at issue in Citizens United “target[ed] a class of communications
that is especially likely to corrupt the political process, that is
at least one degree removed from the views of individual
citizens, and that may not even reflect the views of those who
pay for it.” 204 While the Court focused on corporations being
deprived of its political speech rights, it did not seriously take
into consideration the impact its holding had on the
shareholders of those corporations. 205 The issue of dissenting or
minority shareholders was swiftly punted off as an issue of
corporate democracy, and therefore not a sufficient reason to
restrict corporate political expenditures. 206
The dissent went into greater detail about how
shareholders might be affected by letting corporations make
unlimited political contributions. 207 Specifically, some
shareholders might have their financial investments “used to
undermine their political convictions.” 208 Although the majority
allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a
corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs
does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b.
204. Id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 361–62 (majority opinion) (“There is, furthermore, little
evidence of [abuse] that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the
procedures of corporate democracy.’” (citing Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 794 (1978))).
206. See id. (dispensing with the Government’s argument that corporate
independent expenditures can be limited to protect dissenting shareholders
from being compelled to fund corporate political speech).
207. See id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing unlimited corporate
political contributions as coerced speech for shareholders who do not support
the cause).
208. See id. at 475 (noting that the shareholders foot the bill to fund the
political cause the corporation decides to support).
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said this potential harm could be remedied through corporate
democracy and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits, a favorable
result for shareholders is unlikely, and the injury has already
occurred. 209 Despite the Court’s assumption that shareholders
could protect themselves through corporate governance, a study
found that “shareholders were not able to protect themselves
from misuse of corporate funds for political purposes prior to
Citizens United, and the risk of such misuse has increased as a
result of the decision.” 210
Not only does giving freedom of political speech to
corporations in the form of political spending hurt minority
shareholders, it also undermines individuals’ speech. 211
Allowing unlimited political spending by corporations for use in
advertising and campaigning will inevitably lead to the
silencing of the voices of individuals and grassroots efforts in
elections. 212 There is a recognized concern that allowing
powerful corporations to use their vast economic power to
contribute to political campaigns can drown out the voices of the
voters during the electoral process. 213

209. See id. at 477 (“By ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court
means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for
breach of fiduciary duty. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell
you that ‘these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent . . . .’”).
210. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before
and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 659 (2012).
211. See Imtanes, supra note 34, at 212 (“Democracy is supposed to be
based on the popular vote of the people. Corporations that exert unlimited
amounts of money to campaign advertising cause increased control over the
outcome of elections. Corporate speech after Citizens United may overwhelm
individual speech.”).
212. See id. at 213 (“A threat to democracy may result from corporate
campaigns and advertising overshadowing and overpowering the voice of the
average person.”).
213. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 915 (“It has long been
recognized however, that the special status of corporations has placed them in
a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not
regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our
democracy, the electoral process.” (citing Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 809 (1978))).
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2. Proposed Framework and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
In Hobby Lobby, the Court considered the purpose behind
the religious protections granted in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). 214 When looking at the statutory
history of RFRA, the Court found it was enacted “in order to
provide very broad protection for religious liberty.” 215 RFRA’s
enactment was in response to several Supreme Court decisions
that criticized religious exemption challenges to laws of general
application and enforcement. 216 Congress responded to this
criticism by declaring that laws which appeared to be “neutral”
towards religion, “may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.” 217 It is
evident from the legislative history that the purpose of RFRA
was to protect the exercise of religion, even from laws of general
applicability.
What is less clear is whether that protection should extend
to for-profit corporations. The question over whether the HHS
mandate should apply to corporations was considered because,
when enacting the contraceptive mandate, HHS intentionally
included an exemption for religious nonprofits corporations. 218
The text of the statute specifically prohibited the “Government
[from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability.” 219 Despite the fact that the text of the statute
explicitly said a “person’s exercise of religion,” the Court
nevertheless
determined
that
“persons”
included

214. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693–94 (2014)
(discussing the RFRA).
215. See id. at 693 (providing the enactment history of the RFRA).
216. See id. at 694 (“Congress responded to Smith by enacting RFRA.”).
217. See id. (reviewing the congressional findings that served as the
foundation behind the RFRA).
218. See id. at 688–92 (describing the HSS’s contraceptive mandate
exemption for religious nonprofit corporations which ensures the employees of
these organizations have the same access to the contraceptives as an employee
of a company who does not have a religious exemption).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1a (2018) (emphasis added).
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corporations. 220 The Court failed to mention, but the dissent
eagerly pointed out, that when RFRA was passed, the Senate
voted down an amendment “which would have enabled any
employer or insurance provider to deny coverage based on its
asserted religious beliefs or moral convictions.” 221 In light of the
Senate’s decision, it seemed as though Congress purposely
decided not to leave health care choices, including contraceptive
methods, to the discretion of employers. 222 Additionally, the
Court had never before, until the instant case, granted for-profit
corporations a “religious exemption from a generally applicable
law.” 223 Looking at the text of the statute, the legislative history,
and case precedent, it seems as though RFRA was not meant to
apply to for-profit corporations.
Even if the Court was convinced that RFRA applied to
for-profit corporations, it did not adequately take into account
the harm granting these corporations religious protections has
on individual employees. A potential negative result of the
holding was the disenfranchisement of individual employees, by
potentially only valuing majority shareholders or owners. 224 The
dissent and the Department of Health and Human Services
made compelling arguments about the grave implications the

220. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 707–08 (“Thus, unless there is
something about the RFRA context that ‘indicates otherwise,’ the Dictionary
Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer to the question whether
the companies involved in these cases may be heard.”).
221. Id. at 744 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
222. See id. (“Rejecting the ‘conscience amendment,’ Congress left health
care decisions—including the choice among contraceptive methods—in the
hands of women, with the aid of their health care providers.”).
223. See id. at 751–52 (“The absence of such precedent is just what one
would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons,
not artificial legal entities.”).
224. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 32, at 925 (“[T]he Citizens United
and Hobby Lobby holdings strongly suggest that the only human beings that
count in corporations are the ones who control them. The people who are
employed by them or hold minority ownership interests in them seem to count
for little.”).
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majority’s decision and interpretation of RFRA had on third
parties. 225
The dissent went into greater detail on the potential
consequences of denying women these four contraceptives. 226
For example, corporations wanted to exclude intrauterine
devices (IUDs) under the mandate. 227 Excluding IUDs is
problematic because they are attractive to employees because of
their effectiveness but they are more expensive to pay for out of
pocket. 228 Specifically, a report showed that the average cost of
an IUD is approximately equal to “a month’s full-time pay for
workers earning the minimum wage.” 229 Shifting this cost to
women employees because the family owners of a for-profit
corporation had religious objections may have weighed more
heavily into the majority’s decisions had it used the framework
set forth here. The Court disregarded the potential health
impacts its decision would have on thousands of female
employees and their dependents who do not share the same
religious beliefs as their employers. 230
3. Proposed Framework and Braswell v. United States
Applying the framework set forth in this Note to Braswell,
the purpose of the protection against self-incrimination must
225. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
In the Court’s view, RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit
corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the
corporation owners’ religious faith—in these cases, thousands of
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of
persons those corporations employ.
226. See id. at 761 (“The coverage helps safeguard the health of women for
whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening.”).
227. See id. (discussing the contraceptives for which Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga resisted coverage).
228. See id. (explaining the problem with excluding IUDs from coverage).
229. Id. at 762.
230. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 61, at 1730 (“The majority’s analysis
disregarded the impact on thousands of employees and dependents who do not
share the religious faith of the shareholders.”).
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first be explored. The purpose of the right against
self-incrimination is to protect individuals from exposing
themselves, not a third party, to liability—criminal or civil. 231
Because the privilege against self-incrimination has been long
recognized, the Braswell Court adopted much of the reasoning
about its purpose from past cases. 232 The nature of the privilege
against self-incrimination stems from a deeply personal level,
which can apply only to individuals. 233 Our justice system has
held this right in high regard, even though the privilege is
sometimes subject to misuse. 234 The privilege against
self-incrimination is meant to protect individuals from any
disclosure of words, documents, or chattels sought to be used
against him or her in a legal proceeding. 235
Because of the foregoing reasons, the Court declined to
extend the right against self-incrimination to corporations and
other business entities pursuant to the collective entity
doctrine. 236 The Court declined to extend the right to
corporations and other artificial entities, making this the “only
provision of the Bill of Rights that the Supreme Court has held
to be completely unavailable to corporations and other business
entities.” 237 Because the privilege against self-incrimination is a
231. See Lance Cole, Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New
Era of Limited Liability Entities—Should Business Entities Have a Fifth
Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005)
First, the Court made clear that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal privilege that cannot be asserted by
a witness to protect a third party from prosecution, whether the
third party is another individual or a corporation and whether or
not the witness is an agent of the third party.
232. See generally Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 103–09 (1988).
233. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (noting that the
privilege against self-incrimination grows out of the regard our jurisprudence
has for dignity, humanity and impartiality).
234. See id. at 698–99 (“While the privilege is subject to abuse and misuse,
it is firmly embedded in our constitutional and legal framework as a bulwark
against iniquitous methods of prosecution.”).
235. Id. at 699.
236. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 (“[F]or the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently
from individuals.”).
237. Cole, supra note 231, at 10.
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personal one, it cannot be used by or on behalf of any corporation
or business organization. 238 Through a series of cases,
culminating with Braswell, the Court expanded the collective
entity doctrine to prevent a sole shareholder of a corporation,
which was previously operated as a sole proprietorship, from
invoking
his
Fifth
Amendment
right
against
self-incrimination. 239 The distinction between a sole
proprietorship and a collective entity is important when
determining whether the purpose of the privilege against
self-incrimination is fulfilled when extended to corporations. 240
When individuals act as representatives for an organization,
they are not exercising their own individual rights, “rather they
assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity”
and have no privilege against self-incrimination. 241
When denying protection against self-incrimination to
corporations, individual agents of the corporations are the ones
who must produce the corporate documents, often themselves
becoming subject to parallel civil or criminal proceedings. 242 The
nature of investigations results in law enforcement targeting
both the companies and the individuals who work for those
companies simultaneously. 243 The risk of parallel proceedings
has the potential to harm litigants because a litigant is often not
238. White, 322 U.S. at 699.
239. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101–02 (“The District Court denied the
motion to quash, ruling that the ‘collective entity doctrine’ prevented
petitioner from asserting that his act of producing the corporations’ records
was protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”).
240. See id. at 104 (“Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole
proprietorship, Doe would require that he be provided the opportunity to show
that his act of production would entail testimonial self-incrimination.”).
241. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
242. See 13 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 131:15 (4th ed.) (explaining that for the past forty years, the Supreme Court
has recognized the government’s ability to conduct simultaneous civil and
criminal investigations).
243. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 387 (1981) (“[L]aw enforcement officials cannot afford to ignore
either the individual or the firm in choosing their targets, but can realize
important economies of scale by simultaneously pursuing both.”).
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informed there is more than one investigation happening, and
some courts do not require disclosure of concurrent
investigations. 244 There are significant risks for litigants
involved in civil proceedings because they may also be potential
targets in criminal investigations. 245 For example, if a litigant
chooses to testify at a civil proceeding, he or she may expose
himself/herself to criminal prosecutors in the process of building
a case against the litigant, or others involved in the matter. 246
The Court in Braswell acknowledged the dangers of
requiring a corporate custodian of company records to produce
documents because the act of production may personally
incriminate the individual. 247 Acknowledging the threat, the
Court decided to strike a balance. 248 Evidentiary immunity, as
the Court established in Braswell under the collective entity
doctrine, is far narrower than immunity under 18 U.S.C.A. §§
6002, 6003 which apply to those who assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under the
act-of-production doctrine. 249 Sections 6002 and 6003 require a
244. See 13 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 131:15 (“The [Ninth Circuit] also noted that, although the government may
not ‘affirmatively mislead the subject of parallel civil and criminal
investigations,’ the SEC had no affirmative duty to inform witnesses of an
existing or contemplated criminal investigation.” (citing United States v.
Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 940–41 (9th Cir. 2008))).
245. See id. (“Because parallel proceedings may arise in a government
investigation of almost any commercial transaction in which allegations of
fraud have been made, counsel representing a client in an investigation
involving the SEC should carefully consider whether a related criminal
investigation may have commenced.”).
246. See id. (“Litigants in civil proceedings who are also the potential
subjects or targets of criminal investigations face significant risks.”).
247. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117–18 (1988) (“Although
a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground that
his act of production will be personally incriminating, we do think certain
consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s act of production is one
in his representative rather than personal capacity.”).
248. See id. at 118 (stating that the custodian must produce the corporate
records, even if personally incriminating, but the government is prohibited
from making direct evidentiary use of the act of production in any subsequent
prosecution of the custodian).
249. See SARAH SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:14
(2d ed. 2019) (“[T]he government cannot take the inconsistent position of
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witness to testify or provide information pursuant to a court
order, and that information may not be “used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.” 250 Evidentiary immunity is the automatic protection a
witness gets when forced to produce corporate documents. 251
While evidentiary immunity may seem sufficient to protect
individuals, it often is not because in an independent criminal
prosecution of the corporate custodian, the government may
present evidence the corporation produced certain documents,
without saying who produced the documents. 252 This merely
leaves the jury to draw the line between the criminal defendant
custodian, who potentially was the sole shareholder of the
corporation, and the fact that he produced the incriminating
documents. 253 In practice, the collective entity doctrine allows
prosecutors to get the corporate documents without granting
full transactional immunity, leaving the producing individual
only evidentiary immunity. 254
The purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is a
purely personal one and does not seem to nicely extend to
corporations. However, when looking at how the Court has in
the past made exceptions for certain types of corporations when
granting rights—in Hobby Lobby with religious protections for
demanding that the particular individual produce corporate records in his
representative capacity, and then advise the jury at trial that that individual
was the person who produced them . . . .”).
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003 (2018).
251. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 (“Therefore the government concedes,
as it must, that it may make no evidentiary use of the ‘individual act’ against
the individual.”).
252. See id. (“The government has the right, however, to use the
corporation’s act of production against the custodian.”).
253. See id. (“Because the jury is not told that the defendant produced the
records, any nexus between the defendant and the documents results solely
from the corporation’s act of production and other evidence in the case.”).
254. See Cole, supra note 231, at 53–54 (“More important for purposes of
the collective entity doctrine, it makes it possible for investigators and
prosecutors to compel a business entity to produce documents and records
without granting full transactional immunity to the entity, thus leaving open
the option of subsequently prosecuting the entity.”).
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close corporations but not publicly traded corporations—a
similar exception can be made for the privilege against
self-incrimination. After balancing the purpose of the right and
how it can be fulfilled when extended to artificial entities with
the harm done to individuals by not extending the right to
corporations, the Court can modify the existing rule to give
entities with only one single shareholder protection under the
Fifth Amendment.
4. Proposed Framework and Jesner v. Arab Bank
In Jesner, the Court determined that the ATS did not
extend to suits against foreign corporations. 255 The scope of the
ATS at the time of its enactment pertained to violations of “safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy.” 256 Specifically, what prompted the enactment of the
ATS was a series foreign-relations problems, for which the
government had no adequate remedies under the Articles of
Confederation. 257 In reaching this decision, the Court looked at
the history and purpose of the ATS, finding that its objective
was to “avoid foreign entanglements,” 258 specifically,
international comity was the primary purpose for enacting the
ATS. 259 The ATS was not meant to be a divisive statute, but
255. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (“[T]he Court
holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under
the ATS.”).
256. Id. at 1397.
257. See id. at 1396
In 1784, the French Minister lodged a protest with the Continental
Congress after a French adventurer . . . assaulted the Secretary of
the French Legion in Philadelphia. . . .A few years later, a New
York constable caused an international incident when he entered
the house of the Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his
servants.
258. See id. at 1397 (stating that the purpose in enacting the ATS was to
avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum,
since failing to have one could cause another nation to hold the United States
responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen).
259. See Doyle, supra note 137, at 58 (“However, comity was, in fact, the
reason that Congress passed the ATS, and it might require the exercise rather
than the rejection of jurisdiction.”).
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rather was “intended to promote harmony in international
relations.” 260
There was not much argument over the purpose of the ATS
between the parties in Jesner or between the majority and the
dissent. The major controversy, and ultimately the deciding
point of the case, was over whether the ATS was meant to
encompass suits against foreign corporations. 261 After the
decision in Kiobel, it was left unresolved whether the ATS
extends to suits against foreign corporations. 262 Due to the
uncertainty after Kiobel, some legal scholars still believed that
the decision did not bar ATS claims against certain foreign
corporations. 263
The Court in Jesner gave an overview of when international
courts granted jurisdiction over natural persons, starting with
the Nuremberg Tribunal, which was the prosecution of those
involved in the atrocities at concentration camps during World
War II. 264 The Court went on to list other instances where the
scope of jurisdiction was limited to individuals, such as the
United States Military Tribunal in its prosecution of “24
executives of the German corporation IG Farber;” 265 the “Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court;” 266 and several
other examples of the international community’s decision to

260. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406.
261. See id. at 1398 (“With these principles in mind, this Court now must
decide whether common-law liability under the ATS extends to a foreign
corporate defendant.”).
262. See id. at 1395 (“The rationale of the holding, however, was not that
the ATS does not extend to suits against foreign corporations. That question
was left unresolved.”).
263. See Doyle, supra note 137, at 66–67 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s narrow
holding in Kiobel should not bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims
against foreign corporations with substantial ties to the United States.”
(quoting Professor Beth Stephens)).
264. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1400 (2018) (“The Charter
for the Nuremberg Tribunal, created by the Allies after World War II, provided
that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over natural persons only.”).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1401.
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limit the authority of the tribunals to natural persons. 267 The
petitioners in Jesner argued to extend the ATS to suits against
foreign corporations by giving examples where international
conventions enabled corporations to be held liable. 268
Another reason to not extend the ATS to suits against
foreign corporations is pursuant to separation of powers. The
Court urges that the decision to allow suits against foreign
corporations under the ATS should only be made by an act of
Congress, not by the judicial branch. 269 The opposing view of
this argument is that the ATS explicitly limits the class of
plaintiffs to “aliens” while not limiting the class of defendants
at all, suggesting that Congress did not wish to limit who may
be sued under the ATS. 270 Additionally, the dissent recites
instances in which the political branches, and not the judiciary
have “twice urged the Court to reach exactly the opposite
conclusion of the one embraced by the majority.” 271
While the Court in Jesner went into detail about arguments
for and against extending ATS liability to foreign corporations,
it did not take the additional step to adequately assess and
weigh the harm suffered by individuals, as set forth in this
framework’s third step. The Court quickly espoused the notion
that individuals harmed by the tortious conduct of corporations
can nevertheless bring a suit against the individuals in that
corporation, so there is no need to sue the corporation under the
ATS. 272 The concern that individuals will stop seeking to hold
other individuals responsible in favor of seeking the deep
267. See id. at 1400–01 (discussing the jurisdiction of international
courts).
268. See id. at 1401 (referring to the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as an example of a convention
which imposes an obligation on nation-states to hold corporations liable in
certain circumstances).
269. See id. at 1403 (“[A]bsent further action from Congress it would be
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”).
270. See id. at 1426 (“[S]ilence as to defendants cannot be presumed to be
inadvertent.”).
271. Id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 1405 (majority opinion) (“And plaintiffs still can sue the
individual corporate employees responsible for a violation of international law
under the ATS.”).
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pockets of foreign corporations was the extent of the concern the
Court had with the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. 273 However,
the dissent argued that just because those harmed by the
conduct of corporations can hold the individuals personally
liable, that does not immunize the corporation. 274
VI. Concluding Thoughts
This Note takes a methodical approach going through four
important, yet controversial, constitutional and statutory
rights. These rights in and of themselves are not necessarily
controversial—it is the Court’s ad hoc application of them to
corporations which make them contentious. As the law stands
today, for-profit corporations have unfettered political spending
power, they are protected from legislation which “substantially
burdens” their exercise of religion, and foreign corporations are
protected from being defendants in an ATS suit. Artificial
entities, no matter how small, however, do not have the
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment.
There is no explicit guide for courts to follow when
determining whether or not a corporation gets the protection of
certain rights. The unpredictable way in which the Court
assigns these rights has caused frustration with the parties
involved in the litigation and the general public. After analyzing
the arguments of the four major cases in this Note, it is apparent
that much of the turmoil over these rights stems from the effect
they have on individuals. In all four instances, the Court’s
holdings have potentially grave consequences for innocent third
parties.
The framework proposed in this Note is an attempt at
making a more predictable yet thoughtful determination when
273. See id. (“If the Court were to hold that foreign corporations have
liability for international-law violations, then plaintiffs may well ignore the
human perpetrators and concentrate instead on multinational corporate
entities.”).
274. See id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding only individual
employees liable does not impose accountability for the institution-wide
disregard for human rights. Absent a corporate sanction, that harm will
persist unremedied.”).
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deciding if a constitutional or legal right applies to a
corporation. Looking at the purpose of the right in question is
important to carry out the proper intention of the right. Part II
analyzes that purpose and determines if it is furthered when
applied to a corporation. That is important because corporations
today are not the same corporations in existence at the time the
right was established. Lastly, considering the potential harm
individuals may suffer as a result of granting corporations the
right in question is crucial. While protecting and promoting
corporations, it cannot rightfully be done at the expense of
individuals’ rights. This Note is about striking a balance, and
such balance is accomplished through the framework proposed
in pursuit of predictability and fairness.

